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INDIGENTS, HOSPITAL ADMISSIONS
AND EQUAL PROTECTION
I. INDIGENTS' ACCESS TO HOSPITAL CARE
Many persons cannot afford essential hospital care. Govern-
ment programs provide hospital care for the very poor' and for
the elderly, 2 while other persons enjoy private health insurance
coverage of all or most hospitalization costs. 3 Still there exists a
stratum untouched by either system and composed of non-elderly
indigents who do not qualify for welfare or Medicaid but never-
theless have incomes falling below poverty guidelines. 4 This stra-
tum is partially composed of the "medically needy," 5 and arises
when states set maximum income limits for Medicaid below po-
verty guidelines. 6
Furthermore, although most public hospitals are required by
law to admit indigent patients 7 and many private hospitals as a
self-imposed rule admit all patients in need of medical care, the
doors of other public and private hospitals are closed to them. It
is difficult if not impossible to document the extent to which
indigents are denied hospital services because of their inability to
pay. 8 Nevertheless, there are indications that the problem is a
substantial one.
The author surveyed ten hospitals in each of ten states, in-
Under Medicaid, federal and state governments pay for inpatient hospital services for
those who qualify, 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10) (1970). For a discussion of Medicaid see
Bernard & Feingold, The Impact of Medicaid, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 726 (1970).
242 U.S.C. § 1395d(a)(iii) (1970). Medicare subsidizes the inpatient hospital care of
enrollees. Id. § 1395(d) (1970).
3 Nearly 163 million persons were covered by hospital expense insurance at the end of
1967. HEALTH INSURANCE COUNCIL AND HEALTH INSURANCE INSTITUTE, 1968 SOURCE
BOOK OF HEALTH INSURANCE DATA 18 (1968).
4 For the purposes of this article the term medically indigent will be used to identify
those persons unable to obtain essential medical care because of their poverty. Under
Office of Economic Opportunity poverty guidelines, a nonfarm family of four with an
annual income below $4,000 is living in poverty. OEO Instruction No. 6004 Ic., Nov. 19,
1971, 37 Fed. Reg. 444 (1972).
5 The term describes those persons whose incomes exceed limits set by the state
regulations for categorical assistance without regard to medical expenses which, if deduct-
ed, would drive their incomes below the state maximums. Inclusion of these persons in a
state's medical program is optional. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1970).
6 For example, the maximum annual income level for a family of four to qualify as
medically needy in Virginia is $3,300. 1 CCH MEDICARE-MEDICAIr GUIDE 15,652
(1971).
7 See e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 124-4-3 (1963).
8 Compounding the documentation problem is the fact that many indigents do not seek
hospital services on the assumption they will be denied.
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cluding hospitals of varying sizes and classifications.9 Five of the
forty-five replies indicated the hospital did not admit all indigents
in need of medical care.' 0 The primary reason given was that
prospective patients not covered by hospital insurance or govern-
ment programs such as Medicaid or Medicare were usually unable
to produce a required preadmission deposit. This practice of re-
quiring a preadmission deposit seems to be common."1
Another indication that the poor are being denied admission to
hospitals is the number of law suits being brought by poor persons
against hospitals throughout the country. These suits seek to
compel hospitals which are recipients of grants under the
Hill-Burton program 12 to provide free or reduced cost hospital
care to persons unable to pay for it.13 Plaintiffs have successfully
argued that the federal statute implies a right of action in affected
parties to enforce compliance by private hospital-recipients of
Hill-Burton funds.
In addition to the many poor families who do not qualify for
welfare assistance and the accompanying Medicaid benefits, 14
indigents are also denied hospital services because they have
9 The survey was conducted in the fall of 1971. Responses received by the author are on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform. The number of beds per
responding hospital ranged from 63 to 2,173. These hospitals included public, private
nonprofit, and private for-profit institutions.
10 These respondents included three public, one private nonprofit, and one private
for-profit hospital.
11 See, e.g., LeJuene Road Hosp., Inc. v. Watson, 171 So.2d 202 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1965). On her doctor's advice a mother took her son to defendant hospital for an
appendectomy. There the eleven year old was taken upstairs, undressed, examined, and
given medication. Although it was a Saturday evening, plaintiffs were then told to leave the
hospital since the mother was unable to produce a $200 cash deposit after two hours.
There was evidence that the boy was seriously ill when he went to another hospital to have
the operation performed. The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed a $5,000 judgment
holding the hospital liable to the boy for wrongful discharge of a patient. The court
indicated the result would have been different had the hospital not performed procedures
amounting to the admission of the patient. 171 So.2d at 203.
One study documented cases of hospitals in five states which require preadmission
deposits for those who do not have outside resources to pay for their hospitalization.
NATIONAL LEGAL PROGRAM ON HEALTH PROBLEMS OF THE POOR, STATEMENT OF THE
NATIONAL LEGAL PROGRAM ON HEALTH PROBLEMS OF THE POOR ON PROPOSED RULES
FOR HILL-BURTON PROGRAM 4-21.
12 42 U.S.C. §§ 291-29Io (1970). Hill-Burton is a program by which the federal govern-
ment channels construction funds to hospitals through the states. States wishing to partici-
pate conduct a statewide survey and inventory of existing facilities and develop a state
plan for construction. Id. § 29 Id(a). The state must determine need for additional facilities,
id. § 29 ld(a)(4), priority for construction, id. 29 ld(a)(5), and provide minimum standards
for maintenance and operation of facilities, id. § 291(a)(7). Recipient hospitals agree to
provide a reasonable amount of free or reduced cost care to those unable to pay. Id.
§ 29 1c(e).
13 See, e.g., Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hospital, 319 F.Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970)
(upholding a private right of action in affected parties); Euresti v. Stenner, 327 F. Supp.
I ll (D. Colo. 1971), rev'd, 40 U.S.L.W. 2652 (10th Cir. April 4, 1972) (dismissal reversed
on the ground that there is a private right of action under Hill-Burton).
14 See notes 4-6 and accompanying text supra.
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recently migrated. States have programs providing free hospital
services to indigents who meet certain eligibility requirements,
one of which is likely to be a durational residency requirement in
the county or state. 15 Such requirements effectively exclude from
eligibility those who have recently moved into the jurisdiction. 16
This article seeks to accomplish two purposes: to analyze re-
cent constitutional developments to determine whether the una-
vailability of inpatient hospital services 17 to the medically in-
digent18 works a denial of equal protection of the laws, and then
to survey legislative action as well as stop-gap action by the
courts designed to correct any such denial of equal protection. 19
II. HOSPITAL SERVICES AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Hospital admissions criteria resting on either ability to pay for
services or ability to make a deposit create a classification based
on wealth. Some states further distinguish among those unable to
pay by providing free hospital care to some indigents while de-
nying the same services to others who fail to meet durational
residency requirements.
A. State Action
Some states authorize counties and cities to establish and main-
tain public hospitals. 20 When these public institutions deny admis-
sion to the indigent, state action clearly is involved.21 Where the
15 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-416 (Supp. 1971) (one year in the county and two of
the last four years in the state); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-2302(e) and 88-2302(f) (1971) (six
months in the state).
16 See Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1971), where the court held a
requirement of twelve months residence in the county violative of equal protection.
17 Inpatient hospital services include bed and board, nursing services, use of hospital
facilities, medical-social services, drugs, biologicals, supplies, appliances, equipment, diag-
nostic and therapeutic items, and medical or surgical services furnished by a physician,
resident, or intern when billed through the hospital.
18 See note 4 supra.
10 For discussion of other aspects of the health care problem, see Symposium-Health
Problems of the Poor, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 641 (1970); Health Care Symposium, 35 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 229, 667 (pts. I & 11) (1970); Rose, Hospital Admission of the Poor and
the Hill-Burton Act, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 185 (1969); Rose, The Duty of Pub-
licly-Funded Hospitals to Provide Services to the Medically Indigent, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 254 (1970); Cullen, Hospital Duty to Provide Emergency Medical Care for the
Indigent and Medically Indigent, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 287 (1970).20See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 1441 (West 1970); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 139-32-1(31) (1963).
21 See Foster v. Mobile County Hosp. Bd., 398 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1968), where a
hospital created by act of the state legislature and having received both state and federal
funds was held to be a public institution involved in state action. Plaintiff's denial of
admission to the medical staff of the hospital was held to be a violation of equal protection
where admittance was conditioned upon obtaining signatures of two members of the active
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hospital in question is not authorized and maintained by a state or
political subdivision, but rather is a private concern, the question
of state action becomes more difficult. However, various factors
of state involvement in the operation of the private hospital can be
isolated, particularly state aid to the hospital and regulation of the
operation and construction of the hospital, the total constitutional
effect of which may be state action.
State aid to a private hospital takes several forms. The state
may directly appropriate funds or grant property to the hospital; it
may indirectly subsidize the hospital through payments for charity
or welfare patients; or it may grant property tax exemptions to
nonprofit hospitals. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit in Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospi-
tal 22 relied heavily on the fact that the private hospitals in ques-
tion had received large construction grants through the
Hill-Burton program23 in determining that racial discrimination by
the hospitals involved state action.2 4 The same court also relied
on grants of state construction funds to a private hospital in Eaton
v. Grubbs2 5 to support its finding of state action. Significantly,
these funds were not received through the Hill-Burton program.
Private hospitals also receive financial support through welfare
or Medicaid payments or subsidies for the care of indigents2 6
These payments are more properly viewed as aid to the in-
dividuals receiving services rather than to the hospitals. They no
more turn a private hospital into a state agency than would pay-
ments by a welfare recipient to a grocer or a landlord make them
state agencies. 27
Most states provide indirect financial assistance to non-profit
private hospitals in the form of property tax exemptions. 28 In
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority29 the Supreme Court
staff. See also Sosa v. Bd. of Managers of Val Verde Memorial Hosp., 437 F.2d 173 (5th
Cir. 1971), where a county hospital established pursuant to Texas statute and constructed,
maintained, and operated with county funds was held to be engaged in state action. The
court remanded the case for a determination of whether procedural due process was
denied when a physician was excluded from the medical staff for failure to meet ethical and
professional qualifications.
22 323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1963).
23 The court found the state and federal government to be involved in the geographical
proration of facilities, massive distribution of public funds, and extensive state-federal
sharing in the common plan. See also note 12 supra.
24 For a discussion of Simkins, see Comment, State Action, State Law and the Private
Hospital, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1433 (1964); Comment, Public Control of Private Sectarian
Institutions Receiving Public Funds, 63 MICH. L. REV. 142 (1964).
25 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964).
26 See notes I and 5 supra. This article is not concerned with such indigent recipients.2 7See Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1960).
2 8 See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 137-1-3(5) (1963).
- 365 U.S. 715 (1960).
SPRING 1972]
Journal of Law Reform
considered such tax immunity an important factor in creating the
entanglements between the private restaurant and the government
agency which resulted in a holding that discrimination by the
restaurant was state action. Similarly the Eaton court considered
the tax exemption which the hospital enjoyed significant to a
finding of state action when considered in relation to other factors
of state involvement.3 0
Perhaps more indicative of state action than the amount of state
aid is the degree of control which the state retains over the
hospital. States exercise continuing control by attaching explicit
conditions to financial aid and reserving authority to appoint the
governing body of the hospital. 31 Particularly when the form of
the state aid is a grant of real property, a significant factor is the
amount of control the state or subdivision retains over the hospi-
tal. For example, the Eaton court pointed to a deed of property to
the hospital containing a reverter whereby the property went back
to the city and county should it cease to be used for hospital
purposes.3 2 Similarly, state participation in the Hill-Burton pro-
gram is evidence of control amounting in some cases to state
action.33 For example, the Simkins court found it significant that
the Hill-Burton law required private hospitals that were applicants
to be "integral parts of joint or intermeshing state and federal
plans or programs."3 4 Also in Eaton the court noted that
although the hospital had not participated in the Hill-Burton pro-
gram, the minutely detailed regulations which North Carolina had
adopted to cover all hospitals in the state pursuant to the state's
participation in the program nonetheless applied to the hospital in
question.3 5
30329 F.2d at 714.
31 See, e.g., Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Comm., 397 F.2d 33 (6th
Cir. 1968), where a hospital was held to be engaged in state action when the hospital
commission was appointed by the governing body of the county, and the hospital was the
only one in the area and was financed in part by public funds.
32 329 F.2d at 713. See also Hampton v. City of Jacksonville, 304 F.2d 320 (5th Cir.
1962), cert. denied sub nom., Ghioto v. Hampton, 371 U.S. 911 (1962), where sufficient
control to indicate state action was found when two golf courses would revert to the city if
they ceased to be used as such; Smith v. Holiday Inns, 220 F. Supp. I (M.D. Tenn. 1963),
aff'd as modified, 336 F.2d 630 (6th cir. 1964), where state action was found when the
state housing authority had cleared and redeveloped the land and retained restrictive
covenants. But cf. Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541
(1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (195 1), where a finding of no state action was upheld
although the housing project in question was constructed in accordance with a plan
approved by the city planning commission, the land had been obtained by use of eminent
domain, and the city regulated rents and maintained other regulations.33 See note 12 supra. For example of state statutory compliance with the Hill-Burton
Act, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 66-18-1 (1963); IND. STAT. ANN. § 35-290 (1969).
34 323 F.2d at 967.
35 329 F.2d at 713. See also Sams v. Ohio Valley General Hosp. Ass'n., 413 F.2d 826
(4th Cir. 1969), discussed in text accompanying notes 39-41 infra, where the court held
the hospital's participation in the Hill-Burton program as significant to a finding of state
action.
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States also regulate hospitals through licensing and inspection
laws.3 6 Since it often indicates only the attainment of minimum
standards, licensing alone probably would not indicate sufficient
state involvement. 37 In some states licensing entails more than
certification of minimum standards. Under what is called certifi-
cate of need legislation, hospitals must obtain state approval of
construction of new facilities in order to obtain licenses to operate
them.38 Approval depends upon a finding of need for the addition-
al facility in the community. By assuming control over the avail-
ability of hospital facilities the state has a responsibility to see to
it that they are open to all on a non-discriminatory basis. Sub-
sequent unavailability of services to the medically indigent in such
facilities would appear to be the result of state action.
Findings of state action based on aid and control are not limited
to cases involving racial discrimination. In Sams v. Ohio Valley
General HospitalAssociation3 9 the Fourth Circuit held that three
physicians were denied equal protection when refused staff ap-
pointments and privileges by two private hospitals on the ground
that their offices and practices were located outside the county.
The hospitals' participation in the Hill-Burton program 40 was the
primary basis for a finding of state action. 4 1
In short, there frequently will be a nexus between the hospital
and the state for a court to reach a conclusion that discrimination
by the hospital is state action. The most significant factor of aid
and control results from state participation in the Hill-Burton
program. Thus Congress is responsible for bringing most hospitals
within the scope of the fourteenth amendment by inducing states
to participate in the program.
36 See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-33, -38 (1969); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 395.03,
.09 (1960).
37 See Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant, 268 F.2d 845 (6th Cir. 1968), where
racial discrimination by a private restaurant was not state action despite state laws
licensing restaurants to serve the public. The laws were designed to protect the health of
the community and not to authorize state control of management of the business or
determination concerning whom to serve. Id. at 848. However, in Grier v. Specialized
Skills, Inc., 326 F. Supp. 856 (W.D.N.C. 1971), the court found state action in a case
involving a private barber school which denied services and training to Blacks. A person
seeking a barber's license in North Carolina must attend an approved and licensed school.
Since all such barber schools were segregated and there was no Black school in the area,
the licensing requirement resulted in virtual state exclusion of Blacks from barbering. In
the context of hospital admissions, then, mere licensing may be relevant where the only
hospital in the area discriminates against indigents.38 See, e.g., N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAW §§ 2801-a, 2802 (McKinney 1971); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 23-16-12 (Supp. 1971). For a survey of state certificate of need legislation see
Division of Planning, American Hospital Association, Survey of State Certificate of Need
Legislation 1970, June, 1970.
39413 F.2d 826 (4th Cir. 1969).
40 See note 12 supra.
41 See also Meredith v. Allen County War Memorial Hosp. Comm., 397 F.2d 33 (6th
Cir. 1968), discussed in note 31 supra.
SPRING 19721
Journal of Law Reform
B. Equal Protection
Assuming the facts would support a finding of state action, the
question remains whether a hospital violates a medically indigent
person's right to equal protection of the laws 42 when it denies him
admittance because of his likely inability to pay. Traditionally, in
testing for a violation of equal protection, courts have inquired
only whether the statutory classification in question was rationally
related to a legitimate governmental objective, 43 with the burden
of proving irrationality on the challenger. 4" Applying this test, it
appears reasonable for a state to protect its funds by restricting
hospital care to those who can pay or to those for whom the state
has committed itself to pay.45
There is, however, another, more demanding test when the
classification involved is "suspect" or infringes upon a "funda-
mental right." 46 Racial classifications are especially suspect and
are the subject of rigid scrutiny. In Loving v. Virginia47 the Court
invalidated Virginia's miscegenation statute because it violated
equal protection. The Court there stated that to pass the rigid
scrutiny test racial classifications "must be necessary to the ac-
complishment of some permissible state objective, independent of
the racial discrimination." 48 Applying this stricter test to the de-
nial of admission to hospitals, once it was established that in-
digents were discriminated against, the burden would shift to the
state to show that such discrimination accomplished a permissible
state objective. Moreover, such discrimination would have to be
necessary to accomplish the objective. In like manner more than a
rational connection between the durational residency requirement
and the accomplishment of the state objective would be required;
use of the term "necessary" implies that alternatives less harsh
4 2 U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § I. "No state shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
43 New York Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303 U.S. 573, 578 (1938).
4Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911).
45 See Fullington v. Shea, 320 F.Supp. 500 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd without opinion, 404
U.S. 963 (1971), where the court held the state did not deny equal protection by including
the categorically needy, i.e., those persons who receive cash payments under one of the
categorical federal-state public assistance programs, in its Medicaid program but refusing
to extend coverage to the medically needy. The court applied the rational basis test and
found it rational for the state to limit its program in order to eliminate administrative
difficulty, excessive medical expenses and resultant waste, and to preserve revenue.
46 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 658 (1969) (Harlan, J., dissenting), discussed in
text accompanying notes 75-78 infra; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), discussed in
text accompanying notes 47 and 50 infra. For an extensive examination of equal protec-
tion doctrine, see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065
(1969).
41388 U.S. 1 (1967).
4 8 Id. at I I.
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than those "means which unnecessarily burden or restrict con-
stitutionally protected activity" be unavailable.
49
In its holding in Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,50 the
Supreme Court at least strongly suggested that wealth is also a
suspect classification. The Court there held that conditioning the
right to vote on the affluence of the voter or on the payment of a
fee or tax violated equal protection. Mr. Justice Douglas wrote
that "[l1ines drawn on the basis of wealth or property, like those
of race, are traditionally disfavored." 51 Nevertheless, the Court
has yet to face the situation where a state discriminates directly
against indigents as such. Instead, in the cases decided by the
Court, the discrimination resulted from equal application of a rule
having an unequal effect because of the poverty of the persons
affected. 52 If a state ruled that no indigents could be admitted to a
hospital, the discrimination would be direct and almost certainly
subject to rigid scrutiny.
As in other wealth discrimination cases, indigents are not de-
nied admission solely because of their status of indigency but
because that status makes it impossible for them to raise the
preadmission deposit or makes them a poor credit risk to the
hospital.53 However, in contrast to the classifications based on
wealth which the Court has held unconstitutional, classifications
resulting in a denial of hospital services do not infringe a funda-
mental right.54 The Court is not going to invalidate every indirect
49 Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269, 4273 (U.S. March 21, 1972), discussed in text
following note 79 infra.
50383 U.S. 663 (1966).
51 Id. at 668. In strong dictum in McDonald v. Bd. of Election, 394 U.S. 802 (1969), the
Court said,
a careful examination on our part is especially warranted where lines are
drawn on the basis of wealth or race .... two factors which would in-
dependently render a classification highly suspect and thereby demand a
more exacting judicial scrutiny.
394 U.S-. at 807 (citation omitted). The Court heId that Illinois' failure to provide absentee
ballots for unsentenced inmates of the Cook County jail awaiting trial did not violate equal
protection. For a comparison of classifications based on wealth and race see Sager, Tight
Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection and the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REV.
767 (1969).
52 In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), trial transcripts were provided to those who
could pay for them; only the indigency of the appellants prevented them from obtaining
them. Nonetheless, the Court held this to be a denial of equal protection and due process.
In Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), the payment of the poll tax
was required of all who wished to vote. The indigents were denied the vote only because
they could not pay the tax.
53 See text accompanying notes 9-11 supra. Justice Douglas views even indirect dis-
crimination based on wealth as sufficiently invidious to call for the strict standard of
review. Boddie v. Connecticut, 40 U.S. 371, 383 (1971) (concurring opinion).
54 See Fullington v. Shea 320 F.Supp. 500, 506 (D. Colo. 1970), affid without opinion,
404 U.S. 963 (1971), discussed in note 45 supra, where the court implicitly held that
hospital services are not a fundamental right and applied the rational basis test. Since
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discrimination against the poor where the interest affected is not
fundamental. Take, for example, James v. Valtierra.55 California
passed a state constitutional amendment requiring low-income
housing to be approved by local referenda. This clearly subjected
the poor to special treatment, making it more difficult for them to
obtain low-rent housing.56 The United States Supreme Court,
reversing a three judge federal district court 5 7 held the amend-
ment not violative of equal protection. Justice Black wrote for the
majority that "a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a par-
ticular group does not always deny equal protection. "58,
It remains to be seen whether the Court will follow James and
refuse to apply the stricter standard of review to cases where an
indirect discrimination based on wealth does not infringe a funda-
mental right. Arguably, where the affected interest is of great
importance, although not fundamental, rigid scrutiny should
nonetheless be applied.59 It is illogical to assure an indigent the
right to vote, 60 a free trial transcript, 6' or appellate counsel, 62 but
deny him the necessity of medical care. Furthermore, the state-
ments by the Court that discrimination based on wealth requires
stricter scrutiny would be meaningless if only cases involving
fundamental rights drew the stricter review, because in those
cases the compelling state interest test would be applied regard-
Medicaid benefits include hospital care, their denial, if hospital care were a fundamental
right, would have called for application of the compelling state interest test. Harper
involved voting and Griffin involved criminal justice.
55402 U.S. 137 (1971).
56 In a similar situation involving racial classification the Supreme Court in Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), held invalid a city charter amendment which required open
housing ordinances to be approved by referendum. This made it more difficult for groups
seeking protection of the law to obtain it. The James Court stated that Hunter relied on
distinctions based on race while James did not. 402 U.S. at 141. The Court declined to
extend Hunter beyond racial discriminations, 402 U.S. at 141.
57 Valtierra v. Housing Authority of-the City of San Mateo, 313- F. Supp. I (N.D. Cal.
1970) (three judge court).
58402 U.S. at 142. It may be significant that the decision was five to three with two
members of the majority no longer on the Court and with Justice Douglas taking no part in
the decision. Justice Douglas could be expected to side with the minority in other cases
invo.1ving wealth discrimination. See note 53 supra.
59 See Justice Black's dissent to the denial of certiorari in Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw &
Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971), which involved the denial to indigents of access to civil
courts because they could not pay fees. Justice Black argued that the court should not
distinguish the case from Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971), merely because
Boddie involved the right to a divorce. He said that "the need to be on the welfare rolls or
to file for a discharge in bankruptcy seems to me to be more 'fundamental' than a person's
right to seek a divorce." 402 U.S. at 958.
80 Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). See notes 52-54 and
accompanying text supra.
61 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), discussed in note 52 supra.
62 Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963). The Court held that to deny appellate
counsel to an indigent violated equal protection and due process.
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less of the suspect classification. 63 Invoking the suspect classifica-
tion would be mere surplusage.64
Inpatient hospital services are of such importance that dis-
criminatory classifications resulting in their denial should be sub-
jected to rigid scrutiny. Support for this proposition can be gained
by a comparison with welfare benefits. Although the right to
receive welfare benefits has not been held fundamental, 65 it has
been accorded an important status by the courts. 66 Like welfare
benefits, hospital services are essential to the preservation of
health and life. 67
In summary, when a suspect classification, even though in-
direct, results in the denial of a very important interest, the
stricter standard of review should be applied. Denial of hospital
services to indigents is based on the suspect classification of
wealth, and results in the denial of an important interest-
necessary hospital care. Thus, close judicial scrutiny should be
applied to determine whether a violation of equal protection ex-
ists.
6 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969), discussed in text accompanying
notes 75-78 infra.
64 See note 46 and accompanying text supra.
65 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), where the Court used the traditional
rational basis test in a welfare case to determine that a state does not deny equal protection
by imposing a maximum limit on the size of a welfare grant to a family regardless of the
number of its members. In determining which test to apply the Court will examine three
interests. Dunn v. Blumstein, 40 U.S.L.W. 4269, 4271 (U.S. March 21, 1972); see text
accompanying note 87 infra. A finding of a fundamental right is prerequisite to closer
scrutiny. In determining the fundamental nature of a given right, the Court may be
influenced by the fact that invalidation of a state spending scheme for social welfare
benefits will involve a massive redistribution of state resources. In Dandridge invalidation
of the state maximum levels for family benefits would have forced the state to incur greater
expenditures.
66 In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), decided two weeks before Dandridge, the
Court held that welfare benefits could not be halted consistent with due process without a
prior hearing.
For qualified recipients, welfare provides the means to obtain essential food,
clothing, housing, and medical care.... Thus the crucial factor in this con-
text ... is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over
eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live
while he waits.
397 U.S. at 264. Several commentators have discussed welfare as a right. See generally
Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J.
1245, 1255-56 (1965); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964): Graham,
Public Assistance: The Right to Receive, the Obligation to Repay, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 451
(1968).
67 Justice Marshall stated that when a benefit is necessary to sustain life, stricter
constitutional standards are applied to the deprivation of that right. Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471. 522 (1970) (dissenting opinion). See also Valenciano v. Bateman, 323
F. Supp. 600, 603 (D. Ariz. 197 1), where the court held hospitalization and medical care
for indigents to be benefits essential to the preservation of health and life in the context of
the holding in Shapiro which concerned welfare.
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C. Durational Residency Requirements
and the Right to Travel
Some states provide hospital services to indigents but
differentiate among those who otherwise meet eligibility require-
ments of medical and financial need by requiring a period of
residence in the state"8 or county69 as a condition precedent to
assistance. 70 These requirements create two classes of indigents,
indistinguishable except for the term of their residence within the
state or county. 71
There is a constitutional right to travel, 72  and recent
decisions suggest that denying hospital admission to indigents
who have recently migrated would infringe this fundamental right.
Although the Supreme Court has never attributed the right to
travel to a single provision of the Constitution, 73 four sources
of the right have been advanced. 74 In Shapiro v. Thomp-
68 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. §§ 88-2302(e), (f) (197 1) (six months).
6 9 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 39-416 (Supp. 1971) (one year in the county and two of
the last four years in the state); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-2-13 (Supp. 1971) (permitting
counties to establish up to a three-month period).
70 See notes 15 and 16 and accompanying text supra,
71 This article is not concerned with the question of states restricting benefits to bona
fide residents. Here the concern is with the imposition of durational residency require-
ments on newly arrived, bona fide residents.
72 United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757, 758 (1966). The Court held a federal
statute, which imposes criminal penalties for conspiracy to interfere with a person's
federally secured rights, constitutional and able to reach conspiracies specifically directed
against the exercise of the constitutional right to travel interstate.
73 383 U.S. at 759.74 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 n.8 (1969). The four sources are (I) the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, section 2, see, e.g., Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F.
Cas. 546 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D.Pa. 1825) (Washington, J.); (2) the commerce clause of
article I, section 8, see, e.g., Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941); (3) the privileges
and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, see, e.g., Edwards v. California, 3 14
U.S. 160, 183-85 (1941) (Douglas and Jackson, JJ., concurring), Crandall v. Nevada, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867); and (4) the due process clause of the fifth amendment, see, e.g.,
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 671 (1969) (dissenting opinion), Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116 (1958), Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). The specific source
of the right would not be important where state residency for a specific period is required
for qualification for assistance. The Supreme Court in Shapiro held state residency re-
quirements unconstitutional without determining a specific source. 394 U.S. at 630.
Where the requirement is durational residency in a county, however, the specific source
would be relevant. The power of the state to restrict intrastate migration would not be
affected by the commerce clause which reaches only interstate travel. Ware & Leland v.
Mobile County, 209 U.S. 405, 409 (1908). Article IV, section 2 restricts a state from
discriminating against residents of other states, but not against its own residents. Hague v.
C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (Roberts, J.). Congress would be able to regulate migration if
the source were the commerce clause, Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408
(1946), or the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 688 (1969) (Harlan, J. dissenting). Determining the source of
the right to travel to be an aspect of personal liberty protected by due process would give
protection from either state or federal infringement, with no distinction between interstate
and intrastate migration. Although Justice Harlan determined the source of the right to be
in due process and his analysis determined the restriction to be constitutional, 394 U.S. at
676, his analysis is distinguishable from the present situation. While the right may emanate
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son 75 the Supreme Court invalidated on equal protection grounds
one-year residency requirements for eligibility for welfare. Such
requirements created two classes of needy persons in-
distinguishable, as in the medical services context, except for
length of residence. The states' purposes of deterring an influx of
indigents or limiting benefits to those earlier contributing taxes to
the state, said the Court, were constitutionally impermissible. 76
The Court then examined the interests of the state in maintaining
the classification. The potential recipients had exercised their
constitutional right to travel and any classification which penal-
ized the exercise of that right must be justified by a compelling
state interest. 77 Finding none of the interests advanced by the
state compelling, the Court invalidated the requirements. The
Court complicated its holding by dropping a footnote stating that
some durational residency requirements might be valid not only
because they could meet the compelling state interest test but also
because they would not penalize a person exercising his right to
travel. 78 Recently, in Dunn v. Blumstein,79 the Supreme Court
stated that travel need not be deterred before a penalty is in-
curred. There the Court held durational residency requirements of
one year in the state and three months in the county for voter
registration denied equal protection because the classifications
created thereby penalized the right to travel. The requirements
were not necessary, under the compelling state interest test, to
further the state interests in purity of the ballot or voter knowl-
edgeability.
Durational residency requirements for eligibility for free hospi-
tal services, therefore, must first be determined to be a penalty on
the right to travel before the compelling state interest test applies.
A number of decisions have interpreted the Supreme Court's
holding in Shapiro v. Thompson to the effect that the right to
travel may not be penalized by conditioning other governmental
benefits on periods of residency.80 Some have concluded that
travel must actually be deterred before there is a penalty. For
from the fifth amendment, the clause of action is based on a claim of denial of equal
protection. Thus, a balancing approach such as the one employed by Justice Harlan is
appropriate where due process is denied, Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), but the
compelling state interest test is appropriate where a denial of equal protection is con-
cerned, 394 U.S. at 638.
However, the right to travel may be so fundamental that it should not be limited to a
specific source. Rather, it inheres in all four of the relevant provisions of the Constitution.
75 394 U.S. 618.
76 Id. at 633.
77 Id. at 634.
78 Id. at 638 n.21.
79 40 U.S.L.W. 4269 (U.S. March 21, 1972).
80 See Cole v. Housing Authority of the City of Newport, 435 F.2d 807, 810 (Ist Cir.
1970). The court held two-year residency requirements in the city for low-income housing
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example, in Kirk v. Board of Regents of the University of Califor-
nia81 a California appellate court held that travel would not be
deterred by one-year residency requirements for in-state student
status. While the Kirk court's determination that deterrence is
essential to a finding of a penalty is undoubtedly wrong in light of
the discussion in Dunn, where the Court stated that deterrence is
not required, 82 the Kirk decision may still be good law. The Court
in Dunn stated that three things must be considered to determine
whether a law violates equal protection: the character of the
classification, the individual interests affected thereby, and the
governmental interests asserted. 83 As the court in Kirk properly
recognized, the individual interest in higher education is less sub-
stantial than the immediate and pressing need for the preservation
of life and health involved in Shapiro.84 Thus, the stricter stan-
dard of the compelling state interest test was not warranted al-
though the right to travel was infringed.
In any event, the indigent's interest in hospital care is more
closely akin to his interest in the welfare benefits affected in
Shapiro because both are essential to the preservation of his
health and life. Therefore, a court could find durational residency
requirements for eligibility for hospital services to be a penalty on
the fundamental right to travel. Thus, the classification created by
the residency requirements must be justified by a compelling state
interest because it penalizes the exercise of the fundamental
right.8 5 The interests asserted by the state to support the dis-
crimination against new residents would have to be compelling
and the discrimination would have to be necessary to further
these interests, meaning that less harsh alternatives to the dis-
crimination would not sufficiently further the state objectives.
D. State Interests in Classifications
Based on Ability to Pay or on Fulfillment
of Residency Requirements
Because the classifications involved in the denial of hospital
denied equal protection; in Vaughan v. Bower, 313 F.Supp. 37 (D. Ariz.), aff'd, 400 U.S.
884 (1970), a three judge panel held unconstitutional an Arizona statute permitting a
mental hospital superintendent to return patients to the state of their prior residence if they
had not lived in Arizona for one year.
81273 Cal. App. 2d 430, 78 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 554
(1970).
82 40 U.S.L.W. at 4272.
- 40 U.S.L.W. at 4271.
84 273 Cal. App. 2d at 440, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 266- 67.
85 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
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services are suspect when based on wealth and penalize the
exercise of a fundamental right when based on durational res-
idency requirements, they require strict judicial scrutiny. The
Supreme Court has never explicitly stated that rigid scrutiny
means a compelling state interest test will be applied,8 6 but recent
decisions suggest that this is the test.8 7 It is necessary to examine
what possible state interests are achieved by the classifications
and then determine whether such interests are permissible and
whether the challenged classification is necessary to achieve those
interests.
1. Maintaining Fiscal Integrity-The state does have a "valid
interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its program."88 Requir-
ing hospitals to treat all in need of care might- increase state
expenditures, at least in the short run, because in most cases the
state would also have to assume the financial burden where pri-
vate hospitals were involved.8 9 Increased costs might be the result
of increased utilization or, where adequate facilities are not avail-
able to treat all, different methods of patient selection.
Additional expenditures are not necessary to alleviate dis-
crimination. The state would only be required to make existing
hospital care facilities available on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Thus, neither construction of new facilities nor additional services
would be required to bring provision of hospital care within the
constitutional requirements. The state could maintain total costs
by reducing the amount of available care to each individual and by
making hospital services available only to the extent the state
would be able to provide them.9 0
When asserting the interest in maintaining fiscal integrity the
state should be required to show that in the long run it would be
more expensive to provide hospital services to all indigents. Ad-
8Justice Harlan stated that the Court applied the compelling state interest test when a
suspect classification or fundamental right was involved. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 658 (1969) (dissenting opinion).
87 In Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), the Court held that states denied
equal protection to aliens when they imposed durational residency requirements on aliens
or limited benefits for welfare to citizens of the United States. The classification based on
alienage is suspect and subject to strict judicial scrutiny, but the Court relied heavily on
Shapiro which utilized the compelling state interest test where a fundamental right was
involved.
8 8 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969). The state has leeway in allocating its
available resources among programs as it sees fit, but the state may not invidiously
discriminate among recipients in allocation of these resources. Dandridge v. Williams, 397
U.S. 471, 483 (1970).
89The national average for hospital expenses per patient day in 1970 was $81.0 1. The
average stay was 8.2 days per patient. Hospitals Pt. i, Guide Issue, J. AM. HosP. ASS'N
452, 462 (Aug. 1, 1971).
90 Although this would result in fewer services being available to those able to pay.
increased public pressure would undoubtedly increase over-all services in the long run.
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mittedly, initial costs would be higher because of the adminis-
trative changes and the chronic physical conditions of indigents
who have gone without essential hospital care in the past. Over a
lengthier time span, however, providing equal care might reduce
overall state costs. Lack of hospital care may cause the patient's
condition to deteriorate to a point where emergency hospi-
talization is required.9' Not only may more and longer hospital
care be required, 92 but the indigent's family may become a burden
on the state's welfare rolls for the duration of his illness or
permanently if his capacity to work is impaired.
Even if the state could show that providing hospital care would
cost the state more money, in other contexts the Supreme Court
has not deemed this a sufficiently compelling reason to allow
continued discrimination by suspect classifications. 93 Although
saving money is a legitimate state objective, it may not be accom-
plished by invidious discrimination against indigents. 94
2. Administrative Convenience-The interest in not becoming
overburdened with administrative problems of determining eligi-
bility for services is a legitimate state objective. 95 Because there
are ways of lessening these difficulties, however, they would not
be sufficiently compelling to permit continued discrimination 6
The initial criterion of need for hospital services is objec-
91 A hospital maybe under a duty to provide emergency care because of public reliance
on the existence of an emergency room, Wilmington General Hosp. v. Manlove, 54 Del.
15, 174 A.2d 135 (1961), or because ofa statutorily imposed duty, e.g., ILL. STAT. ANN.
ch. 11 1/2 § 86 (Supp. 1972). See also Powers, Hospital Emergency Service and the
Open Door, 66 M!CH. L. REV. 1455 (1968); Cullen, Hospital Duty to Provide Emergency
Medical Care for the Indigent and the Medically Indigent, 4 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 287
(1970).
92 "Lower income persons tend to be admitted to the hospital at a higher rate and have
longer lengths of stay than higher income persons." Richardson, Poverty, Illness, and Use
of Hospital Services in the United States, 43 HOSPITALS, July 1, 1969, at 42.
93 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971), discussed in note 87 supra; as
a result of the Griffin and Douglas decisions, both of which went off on equal protection
and due process grounds, the state would have to incur additional expenses to provide trial
transcripts and appellate counsel to indigents.
94 In Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), the Court stated:
We recognize that a State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal
integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures,
whether for public assistance, public education, or any other program. But a
state may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between
classes of its citizens. It could not, for example, reduce expenditures for
education by barring indigent children from its schools.
394 U.S. at 633.
95 Administrative difficulty was held a rational basis for maintaining the discrimination in
Fullington v. Shea, 320 F.Supp. 500 (D. Colo. 1970), aff'd without opinion, 404 U.S. 963
(1971), discussed in note 45 supra.
98 There were means of lessening the administrative burden which decreased the weight
placed on that governmental interest in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), discussed
in note 66 supra, which made the governmental interest insufficiently compelling in
Shapiro, discussed in note 75 and text following supra.
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tive-medical need. The burden of showing financial eligibility or
residency could be placed on the indigent, and sliding scales of
charges and long-term repayment schedules could be developed,
thereby reducing the financial burden on the state and hospital.
Fraud could be handled by utilizing normal collection procedures
and criminal sanctions.
The administrative convenience of an objective test of res-
idency served by the durational residency requirement is not a
compelling reason for the discrimination against new residents. As
the Court said in Dunn,
Objective information tendered as relevant to the question of
bona fide residence... -places of dwelling, occupation, car
registration, driver's license, property owned, etc. -is easy to
double check, especially in light of modern commu-
nications. 97
If the state relied on the applicant's statement of length of res-
idency, a person who would lie about being a resident could as
easily lie about length of residency. Any further investigation to
determine duration of residency could just as easily be used to
determine if the applicant were a permanent resident.
3. Facilitation of Planning-The state might contend that
planning for facilities is made easier by limiting services to those
who have been in the jurisdiction for the required period or to
those able to pay, because utilization patterns have been estab-
lished. Planning is a legitimate state objective. However, all states
participate in the Hill-Burton program.98 Pursuant to its participa-
tion in the program each state has undertaken to plan for adequate
hospital facilities for indigents. 99 Therefore, the states should not
be heard to complain that discrimination against indigents is nec-
essary to attain the planning objectives.
The Supreme Court in Shapiro rejected the state's argument
that a one-year residency requirement facilitated planning of the
welfare budget. The state was unable to show how such a require-
ment was used in planning. 100 In the same way, a state would
have to show how a durational residency requirement is used in
planning for provision of hospital services. The costs of gathering
data concerning potential applicants moving in and out of the state
would no doubt outweigh its utility.
9740 U.S.L.W. at 4275, discussed in text following note 79 supra (footnotes omitted).
98 Hill-Burton Program, Progress Report, July I, 1947-June 30, 1969, 66-67 (Public
Health Service Pub. No. 930-F-3, 1969).
99 42 U.S.C. § 29 lc(e) (1970). See note 12 supra.
100 394 U.S. at 635.
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111. REMEDIES ASSURING EQUAL PROTECTION
Several proposals for national health care including provision
for inpatient hospital services are before Congress. Some would
go futher than others in guaranteeing indigents access to hospital
care. 10' Some do not provide coverage for all indigents. 02 Others
would require the indigent to pay certain deductibles which could
be turned into preadmission deposits by the hospital, 03 effectively
excluding indigents because they would not be able to raise the
deposits.
Congress might expand the Medicaid program. It could require
states to include the medically needy in their programs' 0 4 with
Congress setting realistic national maximum income levels for
eligibility. 0 5 Congress could provide an incentive for the states to
include the medically needy by providing federal cost-sharing for
the total program.' 06
Although hospital-applicants for Hill-Burton funds must agree
to provide free or reduced cost services to those unable to pay,
enforcement procedures have been lax. 10 7 The Department of
Health, Education and Welfare is formulating a new regulation to
define more clearly the scope of assurance and to govern its
enforcement. 10 8 The new regulations should be designed to assure
that hospitals will fulfill their obligations. 09 This would not in and
of itself assure equal protection, but it would result in more
available services."10
The states or Congress could require all hospitals to admit
patients on the basis of medical need without regard to ability to
101 See, e.g., S. 3, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (financing a national health security
system through payroll taxes).
102E.g., H.R. 7741, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (providing health insurance in con-
junction with the Family Assistance Plan).
103 1d. See also H.R. 4960, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (providing services through
private health insurance).
104 Inclusion of the medically needy is presently optional with the states. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396d(a) (1970). See note 5 supra.
105 States may establish their own maximum income levels. 45 C.F.R. § 248.11 (1971).
See note 5 supra.
106 Federal cost-sharing is now available only for medical assistance to families whose
income does not exceed 133 1/3 percent of the highest amount which would ordinarily be
paid to a family of the same size without any income or resources in the form of welfare
benefits, 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(f)()(B3)(i) (1970).
107 See text accompanying notes 12 and 13 supra.
10837 Fed. Reg. 182 (1972).
109 For suggested revisions, see NATIONAL LEGAL PROGRAM ON HEALTH PROBLEMS OF
THE POOR, STATEMENT OF THE NATIONAL LEGAL PROGRAM ON HEALTH PROBLEMS OF
THE POOR ON PROPOSED RULES FOR HILL-BURTON PROGRAM 23-31.
110 See note l2supra. Note that "reasonable amount" of services does not mean equal
access by the indigent as required by equal protection.
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pay or make a preadmission deposit."' Durational residency re-
quirements should also be eliminated. States could provide ade-
quate public hospitals or guarantee private hospitals reimburse-
ment for care of indigent patients. Requiring private hospitals to
provide services without reimbursement by the state could result
in decreased services to indigents, because private hospitals in
low-income areas which would bear the burden might be forced to
close, while hospitals in more affluent areas would not be affected
at all.
By increasing the coverage of Medicaid 1 2 the state would
provide more hospital services to more indigents. More states
could include the medically needy in their plans."13 The maximum
income levels to qualify as medically needy should be raised to at
least the national poverty guidelines 1 4 which would more nearly
approach actual levels of need.
Better planning could develop more equitable systems for the
allocation of medical resources in short supply. 1 5 States do this
to some extent now by planning for construction under the
Hill-Burton program and through appropriations to state univer-
sity medical schools. Some states have also developed systems for
comprehensive health planning." 6 More effective and equitable
use can be made of available resources than the fee-for-services
system of allocation." 17
Tax exemptions for private nonprofit hospitals could be elim-
inated. The assumption behind the tax exemptions for charitable
institutions is that they benefit society. It is time to examine this
proposition to determine whether the benefit to society warrants
the cost in lost revenues which could be directed to societal
needs. In lieu of tax immunity, hospitals could be reimbursed for
care actually provided to indigents at reduced or no cost. This
would channel funds to hospitals most in need of them based on
1"' The state has wide latitude under the police power to protect the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the community. See Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934),
where the Court affirmed a conviction for violation of an order of the state milk control
board fixing retail milk prices.
Congress may enact appropriate legislation under section five of the fourteenth amend-
ment to enforce the equal protection clause. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641
(1966), where the Court upheld a section of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 which
prohibited denying the vote to persons who could not read or write English but who had
completed the sixth grade in a school accredited by Puerto Rico.
112 See notes 5 and 6 supra and accompanying text.
1130nly twenty-three states include the medically needy in their plans. I- CCH MEDI-
CARE-MEDICAID GUIDE 15.504 (197 1).
114 See note 4 supra.
115 See generally Note, Scarce Medical Resources, 69 COLuM. L. REV. 620 (1969).
116See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE §§ 437-438.7 (West 1970).
117 See, Garfield, The Delivery of Medical Care, 22 SCIENTIFIC AM., April, 1970, at 15.
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the level of the hospitals' service to society. This would also give
other hospitals not operating at full capacity an incentive to pro-
vide services to those unable to pay.
The judiciary may be the place where elimination of dis-
crimination must begin because of the lack of political influence
which the poor can exert to affect the legislative solutions sug-
gested above. 118 While the courts are in a poor position to devise
and supervise a remedy which would totally eliminate dis-
crimination, the courts could use their equity powers upon a
finding that denial of hospital services to indigents violates equal
protection. 119 They could enjoin the consideration of economic
means in the decision to admit a patient and the requirement of
preadmission deposits. Courts could also void durational res-
idency requirements for free hospital services as uncon-
stitutional. 120 These remedies would not involve the courts in
judicially unmanageable standards because the court would not
become involved in the continuing operation of the hospital.
IV. CONCLUSION
The problems the poor of the United States face in obtaining
necessary hospital care are serious. This article has attempted to
point out that the denial of admission by a public or private
hospital is both sufficient state involvement to indicate state ac-
tion and a violation of equal protection. The classification made
by providing services to those able to pay and denying them to
those without means is an indirect classification based on
wealth-a suspect classification. Where durational residency re-
quirements bar services to indigents the right to travel has been
penalized. In both instances the state interests advanced are
insufficient to allow the discrimination to continue under the strict
118 In Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd as modified sub nom.,
Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969), involving school segregation by race
and economic status, Judge Wright said:
It is regrettable of course, that in deciding this case this court must act in an
area so alien to its expertise. It would be far better indeed for these great
social and political problems to be resolved in the political arena by other
branches of government. But these are social and political problems which
seem at times to defy such resolution. In such situations, under our system,
the judiciary must bear a hand and accept its responsibility to assist in the
solution where constitutional rights hang in the balance.
269 F. Supp. at 517.
"1
9 See notes 59-67 and accompanying text supra.120 See Valenciano v. Bateman, 323 F. Supp. 600 (D. Ariz. 1971), discussed in note 16
supra; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), discussed in note 75 and text following
supra.
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standard of scrutiny which should be utilized; equal access to
hospital care is constitutionally required. Solutions to the problem
vary from making present facilities equally accessible by all to
increasing the level of services to the poor to put them on a par
with the services available to the more affluent.
-Charles S. DeRousie
